Leibniz's Argues on Gods Perfection

This raised serious problems with get a line to contingency and forgive will since it might be argued that upon organism created a fondness (e.g., an individual(a) human soul) already contained altogether the predicates (e.g. all the thoughts, carry throughs, decisions) of that substance and that none of them is, therefore, the result of contingency or assuage will.

Leibniz did non actually find a style of getting around this problem that was convincingly consistent with his system, keep out insofar as his distinction regarding the multiplicity of substances did so. But it sure represented an 'advance' over Spinoza in whose Ethics (1675) the pantheistic argument was that there was save one substance, and that substance was God, which leftover no room for contingency or free will. In Spinoza's view the impression of contingency was merely created by the deficiency of the human mind to grasp the completeness of creation. Since "we basin have but a very inadequate knowledge" of our own minds and bodies, let alone of other things, even the fact that "each individual thing must be determined to existence and action by another individual thing in indisputable and determinate stylus . . . and so on ad infinitum" we can only know that all things ar subject to depravity and this is the only contingency (560). It is a contingency

Spinoza, Baruch. Ethic. Classics of Philosophy. Ed. Louis J. Pojman. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. 532-77.

In looking at creation, however, there argon those who argue that "God might have made things break out than he has" (581). Being perfect, however, God cannot act with less ne plus ultra than he has and, therefore, everything he does must be perfect. The reason much(prenominal) objections are raised is "based upon the too slight acquaintanceship which we have with the general harmony of the universe and with the reasons for God's conduct" (582). Leibniz goes on to establish, via the principle of sufficient reason, that nix God does lacks order and that nothing can talk place within creation that does not conform to that order.

If they transgress the "subordinate regulations which we call the nature of things" (i.e., if they are miracles) they merely reflect God's " fractureicular" intentions. Everything in creation is part of his general intention, and any departure from the subordinate regulations is the result of a particular intention--of which God is perfectly capable since creation is the need result of his general intentions.

There is, of course, no individual substance that can be fully comprehended in this manner by any human mind. In itself this claim seems confusable to Spinoza's contention that the human mind is simply incapable of intellect that which appears to be contingencies. Acts of free will, then, are merely ideas -- substitutes developed because of the inability to see the infinite chain of causation that has produced the apparently free activities.

, however, simply because we are incapable of knowing it. The mind is "a certain and determinate mode of thought and cannot be the free cause of its own actions, or have an absolute faculty of willing or not willing" (566). All volitions are merely ideas to which the mind is determined by an infinite series of causes that are beyond human comprehension.

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